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THE SOVIET LEGACY: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN LATVIA 
Arta Jalili Idrissi1 
Abstract 
The overall aim of this paper is to explore the operation of the Latvian penal system and to 
examine the impact of physical prison conditions on social relationships among prisoners 
and key stakeholders, such as prison officers and administration staff. Specifically the 
research aims to explore how prison conditions affect the interpersonal relationships and 
social order among prisoners and prison staff. If prison’s overriding goals of reform and 
rehabilitation are to be achieved, prisoners as well as prison staff need to be asked how this 
can be accomplished better (redesigning the prison environment, receiving adequate 
assistance throughout the sentencing and appropriate help after release). Therefore, one of 
the envisaged outcomes of this research is not only to understand how the current prison 
physical conditions affect the relationship building and the maintenance of order within 
Latvian Central Prison, but how inmates and prison staff could also provide valuable input in 
future prison strategy design and implementation. 
 
Introduction 
The all-powerful Soviet Union that stretched from Siberia's vast taiga to Eastern Europe left 
a notable legacy for its ‘member states’ for years to come. Latvia was among those states 
that in the early 90s gained its independence; however, the legacy of the Soviet Union is felt 
even in the current day despite all efforts to become a ‘Western state equivalent’. The aim of 
this article is to provide a brief account of imprisonment during the Soviet era and the legacy 
that continues to affect not only the penal system today in Latvia but also society as whole.  
Latvia, like many other post-Soviet states, has suffered from a poor and overcrowded prison 
system ever since establishing its independence. Long prison sentences and a high level of 
crime provided favourable conditions for overcrowded prison cells and a malfunctioning 
system, where offenders often could find themselves in a vicious circle as little or no help 
was available to them both while in prison and after release. The general situation in Latvian 
prisons during the early 1990s was similar to that described by Piacentini (2004) when one 
had to queue to obtain a bed to sleep in because of slow legal changes. Thus, the influence 
of the Soviet Union should not be understated while addressing the issue of imprisonment in 
any post-Soviet state. The first section will look at the concept of imprisonment within the 
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Soviet Union and continue by looking at the Soviet legacy, where it will be argued that in 
Latvia, similar to other former Soviet countries, people are the true carriers and 
representatives of the Soviet legacy. 
 
1 The Concept of Imprisonment within the Soviet Union 
Imprisonment during the Soviet era was a controversial issue. On the one hand, the 
underlying principles of the Soviet Union sought to destroy the roots of crime by eliminating 
private property and promoting the principle ‘from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs’. It was thought that ‘communism’ would bring an ideal system where 
“the putative bases of criminal behavior - class conflict and exploitation - would disappear” 
(Slade & Light, 2015, p.148). On the other hand, the most heinous crimes were 
committed by the state and those in power. The Soviet Union used torture and forced 
deportations of people who either were among the elite of society (bourgeoisie and ‘kulaks’) 
or were thought to be against the Soviet system (‘traitors’) meanwhile imprisoning also other 
non-political criminals. Although there was no official distinction between political prisoners 
under the Criminal Code in the Soviet Union (Amnesty International, 1975) in practice 
political prisoners were treated differently from others. According to the memories of a 
political prisoner the different treatment was based upon the lack of trust in ‘traitors’ ‘they 
were not trusted with any work within the prison, but sat and waited for their sentence, after 
which they were sent on the prisoner transport to the camps’ (Celmina, 1986, p.27). 
 
The Soviet Union certainly failed to achieve the expected ‘crime free’ union. The elimination 
of private property did not support the basic Marxist premise that crime is a socio-economic 
phenomenon. Even if the crime related statistics were kept secret from the mass of the 
people and international observers the continuous existence of prisons and a prison 
population is undisputable. The first official crime statistics were released only in the late 
1990s (Butler, 1992) due to the fact that crime was linked to Western society and capitalism 
and it would be an embarrassment to admit the criminality of fellow comrades. However, 
some explanation for failing to achieve the ‘crime free’ union was provided by the Minister for 
Internal Affairs Shchelokov in 1973 when he tried to defend the idea ‘under Socialism crime 
is not a form of protest against the existing conditions of life [i.e. as it is in the West] but 
above all the result of moral deformation of the personality, intellectual retardedness and low 
culture (Open Society Archives, 1973). Criminals were to be blamed for their ‘faulty nature’ 
and there was no mention of the Soviet gulag camps or political imprisonment. In fact there 
was no reference at all made to ‘political prisoners’ within Soviet law or policy statements. 
Political imprisonment was acknowledged by Soviet leaders regarding Stalin’s reign but its 
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continuous application after his death was denied. Internationally the Soviets insisted that 
penal institutions within the Soviet Union observe and provide ‘even better safeguards and 
conditions for the prisoners than those required by the United Nations' Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners’ (Amnesty International, 1975, p. 5). 
Despite the denial political imprisonment was rife and since the early days of the Soviet 
Union the prosecution of the opposition was a prerequisite for building the first socialist state. 
Such prosecutions continued throughout the Soviet regime forming an integral part of the 
system since indiscriminate punishment even to innocents ensured that nobody felt secure 
and everyone obeyed the system.  So called ‘state enemies’ were tried under Article 58 and, 
quoting Solzhenitsyn, ‘in all truth, there is no step, thought, action, or lack of action under the 
heavens which could not be punished by the heavy hand of Article 58’ (Solzhenitsyn, 1973, 
p.60). Thus Article 58 was used among other tools for indiscriminate punishment. The rate of 
imprisonment would have been much lower if those heavy repressions had not taken place. 
However, those brutal controls and repressions were not a perversion of the system, but the 
natural consequence of attempting to create a new kind of society (Montaner, 2006). To 
some extent this approach succeeded in creating a society that contrasted with the Western 
capitalistic world. However this came at a cost to the human rights and freedoms of all 
Soviet people even without mentioning all those innocent people who paid with their lives.  
Another strategic penal decision applied by the Soviet Union was the ‘in exile’ imprisonment 
(Piacentini & Pallot, 2014). Although this practice, similar to the execution of the political 
opposition, predates the Soviet Union the sheer number of people affected by those 
practices was especially high during the Soviet period. The ‘in exile’ imprisonment displaced 
‘political opposition, criminality and social deviancy to the peripheries’ (Piacentini & Pallot, 
2014, 22) as well as ensured a consistent supply of a reliable work force to the most remote 
areas. 
 
The use of prison labour was especially prominent during Stalin’s reign which can be best 
represented and understood by his personal view ‘death solves all problems. No man, no 
problem’ (Amis, 2002, p.57). Stalin understood the economic viability of prisoner labour and 
as the death of a large amount of people was not one of his concerns, he acted accordingly. 
During his reign the number of imprisoned people in camps increased but at the same time 
prison conditions were made more bearable in order to prolong the life expectancy and 
consequently the camp productivity. During Stalin’s era immense projects were delivered by 
prison labour such as the building of the Moscow channel and the reconstruction of the 
Moscow State University, while many prisoners were forced into mines and infrastructure 
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works in rural territories (such as Siberia). Allegedly from 1929 (the year of Gulag major 
expansion) till 1953 (the death of Stalin) an estimate of 18 million people passed through this 
system and ‘another six million were sent into exile, deported to the Kazakh deserts or the 
Siberian forests’ (Applebaum, 2003, pp4-5).  Thus crime and criminality had an ambiguous 
place within the Soviet regime but undeniably prison labour contributed towards building and 
maintaining the Soviet Union. 
 
2 The Soviet Legacy    
Some might be fascinated by the post-Soviet region encouraging further studies of the 
former Soviet Union countries (Slade & Light, 2015) that is indeed essential in order to shed 
some light on what happened on the other side of the iron curtain and understand its legacy. 
There is an ongoing discussion among scholars about the Soviet legacy that continues to 
affect many of the post-Soviet country penal systems. Solomon (2015, p.159) has argued 
that the failure to eliminate the ‘defining features of the Soviet criminal justice’ framing them 
as ‘distorted neo-inquisitorialism’ has continued the Soviet tradition of ‘the excessive power 
of investigators and weakness of judges’. This argument could be further evidenced by 
considering the disproportionate number of remand prisoners, for example, in Latvia on April 
2014, 42.5 % of the total prison population were on remand (Walmsley, 2014) which 
indicates the excessive power of the investigation stage. 
 
Piacentini and Slade (2015) have argued that one of the Soviet legacies is carceral 
collectivism which is based on three essential characteristics: penal governance rooted 
within peer surveillance, prisoners provided with diffused authority and governance, and a 
communal dormitory type living. That can be also evidenced by the imprisonment system in 
Latvia, where adherence to international standards regarding prisoner rights is still being 
criticised, especially in relation to living conditions (poor material conditions and 
overcrowding) (Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
Report following the September 2013 visit to Latvia, 2013) and the use of large dormitory 
type cells with a capacity of up to 30 people (Spure, 2015).  
Some other wider socio-legal implications were ostensibly inherited from the Soviet Union, 
such as the constant attempt to ‘cheat the system’. During the Soviet times ‘cheating the 
system was an important aspect of survival in the Soviet Union. While burglary and personal 
theft were rare (ethical issues aside, there was little to steal from one another), millions of 
workers regularly pilfered from their place of work’ (Rawlinson, 2010, p.61). Apart from  
pilfering the Soviet citizens could witness the ‘moral hypocrisy’ of the Communist party (the 
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corrupt and well-off elite) that further eroded the citizen value of honesty (Ariely et al., 2014).  
Party members did not have to queue for goods, they had special stores where they could 
shop, they lived in nice houses and had cars (Boettke, 1993).   
Kosals and Maksimova (2015, p.279) have argued that ‘dual reality’ affected the major social 
institutions in Russia which implies that ‘informality largely overtakes the formal institutional 
setting and shapes behavior within formal roles’  enhancing corruption and establishing a 
‘favour system’or ‘blat’. Favarel-Garrigues (2011) has previously studied its link to the Soviet 
period. 
Conclusion  
The Soviet legacy left a lasting footprint not only on a formal level, but also on individuals. 
People experienced a complete change of the system from being completely dependent on 
a nurturing yet despotic state apparatus to a liberal democracy where each individual was 
left to their own means to succeed in the competitive market economy. The new system 
gave opportunities for people to make free choices, to act freely and to have the chance to 
become who ever they wanted to become (Boettke, 2003) whereas previously all spheres of 
human life were controlled. The Soviet Union sought to regulate not only all economic and 
political matters but the attitudes, values, and beliefs of its population determining the kind of 
human being one should be (Bergman, 1998). Thus, the paranoia of being controlled and 
distrust in fellow citizens did not end with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, it continued to 
exist in the minds of people that carried the real legacy of the Soviet Union.  The Soviet 
Union’s ‘human production line’ that lasted for more than five decades created a ‘real’ Soviet 
generation. I am one of the daughters of the ‘real’ Soviet generation parents who were born 
just after the death of Stalin and I came to realise that even I carry on the footprint of the 
Soviet Union like many other descendants of the ‘real’ Soviet generation. The Soviet legacy 
is encapsulated within people who lived and endured the communist workers' utopia as well 
as their descendants.  The legacy continues. 
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